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Abstract
We propose the use of an angel-daemon framework to perform an uncertainty analysis
of short-term macroeconomic models with exogenous components. An uncertainty profile
U is a short and macroscopic description of a potentially perturbed situation. The angel-
daemon framework uses U to define a strategic game where two agents, the angel and the
daemon, act selfishly having different goals. The Nash equilibria of those games provide
the stable strategies in perturbed situations, giving a natural estimation of uncertainty. In
this initial work we apply the framework in order to get an uncertainty analysis of linear
versions of the IS-LM and the IS-MP models. In those models, by considering uncertainty
profiles, we can capture different economical situations. Some of them can be described
in terms of macroeconomic policy coordination. In other cases we just analyse the results
of the system under some possible perturbation level. Besides providing examples of
application we analyse the structure of the Nash equilibria in some particular cases of
interest.
Keywords:Uncertainty profiles; strategic games; zero-sum games; angel-daemon games; IS-
LM model; IS-MP model
1 Introduction
The distinction between risk and uncertainty has become increasingly important since (Knight,
1921) discussed it as we have imperfect knowledge of future events in our ever-changing world.
Informally, risk can be measured by probabilities. In contrast, uncertainty refers to something
where we cannot even gather the information required to figure out probabilities. However,
in practice there is no difference between risk and uncertainty in empirical analysis on the
economy and financial markets. Both are measured by historical standard deviation of the
variable of interest (Hull, 2010; Arratia, 2014). This paper proposes an alternative to dis-
entangle these seemingly indistinguishable concepts applying ideas from game theory and
computer science.
The study of web applications is a field where uncertainty becomes unavoidable. The
angel-daemon framework (Gabarro et al., 2014) provides a way to obtain numerical estimates
of uncertainty in the execution of a Web service. In such a setting, the uncertainty is captured
by an uncertainty profile describing a stressed environment for the execution of the Web
application. Uncertainty profiles provide a description of the perceived uncertain behaviour
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with respect to possible failing services or execution delays. That is, some sites can potentially
misbehave but we are uncertain about the specific sites that will do so. The model attempts to
balance positive and negative aspects. Considering only positive aspects (minimizing damage)
is usually too optimistic. In the opposite side, being pessimistic (maximizing damage) is also
not realistic. Reality often evolves in between optimism and pessimism. To model this
situation, the framework considers two agents : the angel (a), dealing with the optimistic
side; and the daemon (d), dealing with the pessimistic side. These agents act strategically
in an associated angel-daemon zero-sum game. In this context, uncertain situations are
identified with the Nash equilibria of the angel-daemon game and they are assessed by the
value of the game. It is important to emphasize that the results in (Gabarro et al., 2014) are
useful to analyse uncertain stable (or timeless) environments. Thus, the framework analyses
uncertainty in the short-term and it is not useful for a long-term analysis.
In this paper, we present an angel-daemon (a/d) framework to model uncertainty in short-
term macroeconomic models. In the a/d approach the actions undertaken by a and d usually
go into different directions and can affect the result of underlying systems in unexpected ways.
In some cases, a or d may be identified with policy makers or institutions. In other cases, they
may describe a situation created by many interacting agents. We have to be careful about
some facts. First, it is usually mostly difficult to picture a policy-maker or an institution acting
deliberately as d. Second, the distinction a/d at first sight seems unsuitable when it comes
to market participants, as there is not an obvious pessimistic party opposed to an openly
optimistic party. Despite the judging names, it is not our intention to associate any moral
connotation to them. However, there are actors that might be thought of as performing the
role of a or the d, even with moral issues (Akerlof & Schiller, 2009; Akerlof & Shiller, 2015).
We clarify our approach using an example considering the role of the Fed and Wall Street
in the Great Recession in terms of a/d. The Fed, as policy-maker, who tried to improve the
economic behaviour, is identified with a. Wall Street (representing other economic agents)
used this policy strategically for their own interest and we identify them with d. However,
Wall Street (d) interacted with Fed (a) using a policy in an unexpected way (Greenspan,
2013). It is reasonable to assume that the Great Recession appears as a consequence of the
a priori broadly unexpected and strategic interplay between a and d (Besley & Hennessy,
2009).
Our approach may provide another interpretation of the Keynesian animal spirits (Keynes,
2007). As Keynes pointed out, our decisions to do something are mostly the result of a
”spontaneous urge to act” (animal spirits). Thus, in these models, animal spirits (a and
d) can be thought as players in a strategic game. The characters representing a and d are
summarized into the utilities (or dis-utilities) ua and ud. Giving different values to ua and ud
it is possible to shape different situations. For instance, if we set ua = Y and ud = T , the
angel tries to maximize the income (in many cases considered as a good issue) and the daemon
tries to maximize taxes (considered a bad issue in some schools). By setting ua = −T and
ud = r, the angel tries to maximize −T (minimizing T ) and d tries to maximize the interest
rate.
In order to link the a/d framework with short-term macroeconomic models, we identify
the parts of the macroeconomic system to be perturbed. We assume that a and d can exert
some power in the value of some of the exogenous components of the model. We model
the power of action by potential perturbations that a and d might apply to modify the
components’ estimation. The perturbation values are real numbers, so they can be either
positive or negative. We also assume that both agents have limits in the influence they
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can exert. This gives rise to an adequate redefinition of uncertainty profiles describing the
component’s variability in an perturbed situation. As in (Gabarro et al., 2014), once the
uncertainty profile is defined, we analyse the stable situations of the corresponding a/d-game.
The obtained a/d games have a richer structure than the initial application as the potential
strategic situation cannot always be model by a zero-sum game. Nevertheless, we can define
some interesting valuations that can be analysed through zero-sum a/d games.
To test the applicability of the a/d framework, we start with linear approximation of
extensively studied models. In particular, we develop a/d analysis of the InvestmentSavings-
LiquidityMoney (IS-LM) introduced by (Hicks, 1937, 1980-1981) and the InvestmentSavings-
MonetaryPolicy (IS-MP) developed by (Romer, 2000). We have selected those models as
they provide different interpretations of the monetary policy, differentiating periods without
inflation from those with inflation. Besides defining the framework we model uncertainty
of the fiscal policy in the IS-LM model and of the external shocks in the IS-MP model. We
either obtain the Nash equilibria or we analyse the properties of Nash equilibria. In particular,
we show that if we are uncertain of the fiscal policy, there is always a a dominant strategy
equilibria.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we briefly describe the IS-LM and the
IS-MP models. Section 3 is devoted to the formulation of the linear approximations to the IS-
LM and the IS-MP models describing their exogenous components. In Section 4, we provide
a model for the possible perturbations of the set of exogenous components, the so called
perturbation strength model. Section 5 introduces uncertainty profiles and the associated a/d
games tailored to the linear IS-LM and IS-MP models and analyses the Nash equilibria of
some cases. Section 6 studies the IS-LM model when we are uncertain of the fiscal policy and
Section 7 studies the IS-MP model when we are uncertain of the external shocks. Finally, in
Section 8, we raise some concluding remarks and discuss some future research.
2 Basic Macroeconomic Models
In order to make this paper self contained and accessible to a wide audience, we describe briefly
the two basic Macroeconomic models considered in this paper. The IS-LM which is useful
to describe periods with no inflation and the IS-MP in which the inflation is taken explicitly
into account by the monetary policy fixed by the Central Bank. Recall that, according to
Fisher’s equation, the relation between the real interest rate r, the nominal interest rate i
and the inflation π is r = i − E(π) where E(π) is the inflationary expectations. When there
is no inflation, the real and nominal interest rates coincide.
2.1 IS-LM model
The InvestmentSavings-LiquidityMoney model (IS-LM) (Hicks, 1937) provides a way to ex-
press, in equilibrium, the national income and the interest rate as a a function of several
exogenous components. The IS-LM model describes approximately the monetary market
when the gold standard was the norm because the gold can be reasonably represented by
the money supply M . Despite its simplicity, this model continues making useful predictions
(Krugman, 2011). As we have mention before, when there is no inflation, the nominal and
the real interest rate coincide, so only r appears in the equations. This situation of no in-
flation might happen for long periods, the important fact to remember is that inflation is
mostly a twentieth-century phenomenon. Up to World War I, inflation was zero or close to it
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(Piketty, 2014). So, for some time, national income Y and interest rate r were the two main
macroscopic variables. The IS-LM is described by two equations.
• The IS line Y = C(Y − T ) + I(r) + G represents a continuum of equilibria in the
goods market. On it, Y is the national income, r is the interest rate. The remaining
components are the sum of the annual rates of spending by: the consumers (as a function
of the disposable income) C(Y − T ); the investors (as a function of the interest rate)
I(r) and the government G.
• The LM line M/P = L(r, Y ) is interpreted as continuum of equilibrium in the money
market. The money supply is M/P , where M is the money and P is the price level.
The liquidity preference L(r, Y ) is a function of the national income and the interest
rate.
An equilibrium point (Y, r) is a solution of the system of equations. These equilibria corre-
spond to the points where both markets are at mutual equilibrium.
2.2 IS-MP Model
In the thirties, the world was in transition from the gold standard and the monetary policy
of the central banks changed to deal with inflation. In calm periods, central banks ensure
that the money supply grows as economic activity in order to guarantee a low inflation rate
of 1 or 2 percent a year. The Central Bank creates new money by lending to banks for very
short periods (Piketty, 2014). In Europe, the primary objective of the monetary policy of
the European Central Bank is to maintain price stability as a way to contribute to economic
growth and job creation. In the pursuit of price stability, the European Central Bank aims
at maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term (ECB, 2015).
The InvestementSaving-MonetaryPolicy model (IS-MP) (Romer, 2000) considers this new
reality about monetary policy and inflation. The MP equation deals with the interest rate
as a function of the current inflation, the Central Bank expected inflation an the income gap
(Taylor, 1993).
We start with a short description of the dynamic aggregate demand/aggregate supply model
(dynamic AD/AS model) given in (Mankiw, 2013). The model is dynamic because some
variables depend on their lagged (past period) values. In the model t denotes the current
period (usually one year) and is given by the following equations.
• The supply for goods and services is given by Yt = Y t−α(rt − ρ)+ ǫt. In this equation,
the total output for goods and services is Yt and the economy’s natural output is Y t.
The parameter α > 0 measures the sensitivity of the demand in front of the real interest
rate rt and ρ is the natural rate of interest. The parameter ǫt represents the random
demand shock.
• The real interest rate rt is given by a simplified version of Fisher’s equation with no
expectations: rt = it − πt. Where it is the nominal interest rate and πt is the inflation
rate.
• Philips curve. The inflation πt at period t is described by a version of the Phillips curve
as a function of the past inflation πt−1 and with no expectations: πt = πt−1 + φ(Yt −
Y t) + vt. The parameter φ > 0 measures the responsiveness of the inflation to output
fluctuations and vt is the random supply shock.
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Variables V
Taxes 0 < T
Exogenous government spending 0 < G
Money Supply 0 < M
Price index 0 < P
Parameters P
Autonomous consumption 0 < a
Marginal propensity to consume 0 < b < 1
Exogenous investment 0 < c
Interest sensitivity 0 < d
Income sensitivity for real money 0 < e
Interest sensitivity for real money 0 < f
Figure 1: The exogenous components in the linear approximation to the IS-LM model.
• Monetary policy rule. It is based on Taylor’s Rule (Taylor, 1993). The nominal interest
rate it is given by it = πt + ρ + θpi(πt − π
∗
t ) + θY (Yt − Y t). In this equation, π
∗
t is the
central bank’s target inflation rate and θpi > 0, θY > 0 measure responsiveness.
We avoid temporal dependencies and we consider a version of the IS-MP model assuming
that past inflation coincides with the Central Bank target inflation. As before an equilibrium
point (Y, π) is a solution of the system of equations.
3 Linear Approximations and Exogenous Components
We introduce here the linear approximations of the IS-LM and the IS-MP models. For both
simplified models we make explicit their exogenous components. Let us first fix some notation.
We use M to denote a linear approximation of a model, informally M ∈ {IS-LM, IS-MP}. For
a modelM, PM denotes the set of exogenous parameters, VM denotes the the set of exogenous
variables and EM = PM ∪ VM is the set of exogenous components. We use set notation like
b ∈ PM or T ∈ VM. When M is clear from the context we use E , P and V.
3.1 IS-LM Model
We consider the linear approximation of the IS-LM given in (Baldani et al., 2007).
Definition 1. The IS-LM model is described by the following equations.
C(Y − T ) = a+ b(Y − T ), I(r) = c− d r, L(r, Y ) = eY − f r.
The set exogenous components E = V∪P is given by V = {a, b, c, d, e, f} and P = {T,G,M,P}
(see Figure 1).
Let us express the endogenous variables {Y, r} in equilibrium as a function of E . The
equilibrium condition Y = Y (r) (IS line) gives the equation Y = a+ b(Y − T ) + c− d r +G.
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The condition r = r(Y ) (MP line) gives M/P = eY − f r. Thus, we get
Y =
1
(1− b)
(a+ c+G− b T − d r) and r =
1
f
(e Y −
M
P
).
Using matrix notation, the linear system describing Y (r) and r(Y ) can be written as(
1− b d
P e − P f
)(
Y
r
)
=
(
a+ c+G− b T
M
)
.
Solving the system, we get the following expression for the equilibrium point (Y, r).(
Y
r
)
=
1
(1− b)f + d e
(
f d/P
e − (1− b)/P
)(
a+ c+G− b T
M
)
.
Defining g = (1− b)f + d e, we get the following expressions.
Y =
f
g
(a+ c+G− bT ) +
d
g
M
P
and r =
e
g
(a+ c+G− bT )−
(1− b)
g
M
P
.
As (Y, r) depends on the valuation on E , when needed we write (Y (E), r(E)). In order to
simplify notation we often use E to refer also to a valuation of the exogenous components of
the model.
Example 3.1. Consider the following valuation of E :
a b c d e f T G M P
200 3/4 200 25 1 100 100 100 1000 2
The equilibrium point is described by the linear system Y = 1700 − 100r, r = Y/100 − 5.
Solving the system we get Y = 1100, r = 6. 
3.2 IS-MP Model
We present now the linear approximation to the IS-MP model from the dynamic AS/AD
model as given in (Mankiw, 2013). Recall that the equations on Yt, rt and it give us the
following dynamic aggregate demand line
Yt = Y t − αˆ(πt − π
∗
t ) + βˆǫt where αˆ =
αθpi
1 + αθY
and βˆ =
1
1 + αθY
and the aggregate dynamic aggregate supply line is given by
πt = πt−1 + φ(Yt − Y t) + vt.
We consider a simplified linear approximation to the IS-MP in which we avoid dependences
of inflation on their lagged values. We consider only the case where the past inflation coincides
with the Central Bank target inflation, i.e. πt−1 = π
∗
t . Furthermore, assuming that period t
is known, we consider the equations for a fixed period t so that we can drop the sub-index.
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Variables V
Central bank’s target inflation π∗
Natural level of output Y
Shock to Y ǫ
Shock to π v
Parameters P
Y sensitivity to r 0 < α
Natural interest rate 0 < ρ
π sensitivity to Y in Philips line 0 < φ
i sensitivity to inflation in MP 0 < θpi
i sensitivity to Y in MP 0 < θY
Figure 2: The exogenous components in the linear approximation to the IS-MP model.
Definition 2. The IS-MP model is described by the following equations.
Y = Y − αˆ(π − π∗) + βˆǫ and π = π∗ + φ(Y − Y ) + v
The set of exogenous components E = V ∪P in the IS-MP model is given by V = {π∗, Y , ǫ, v}
and P = {α, ρ, φ, θpi , θY } (see Figure 2).
From the description of the equations of the IS-LM model we can write the equations of
an equilibrium for the endogenous variables {Y, π}. Solving the system, as a function of E ,
the equilibrium point is given by
Y = Y + γˆǫ− δˆv and π = π∗ + ρˆǫ+ µˆv
where
γˆ =
βˆ
1 + αˆφ
=
1
1 + α(θY + φθpi)
and δˆ =
αˆ
1 + αˆφ
=
αθpi
1 + α(θY + φθpi)
ρˆ =
φβˆ
1 + αˆφ
=
φ
1 + α(θY + φθpi)
and µˆ =
1
1 + αˆφ
=
1 + αθY
1 + α(θY + φθpi)
.
The preceding equations can be written in matrix form as(
Y
π
)
=
(
γˆ − δˆ
ρˆ µˆ
)(
ǫ
v
)
+
(
Y
π∗
)
or, alternatively as(
Y
π
)
=
1
1 + α(θY + φθpi)
(
1 −αθpi
φ 1 + αθY
)(
ǫ
v
)
+
(
Y
π∗
)
.
The equilibrium point is (Y, π) is a function of the valuation E . As before, when needed we
write (Y (E), π(E)).
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Example 3.2. Consider the following E for the IS-MP model:
α ρ φ θpi θY π
∗ Y ǫ v
1 2 1/4 1/2 1/2 2 100 1 1/2
We can compute directly(
Y
π
)
=
1
13
(
8 −4
2 12
)(
1
1/2
)
+
(
100
2
)
=
1
13
(
1306
34
)
Therefore Y = 1306/13 and π = 34/13. 
4 Perturbation Strength Model
Given M and a valuation E of its exogenous components, the computation of some positive
aspects might have been underestimated or some negative aspects overestimated. Therefore
it makes sense to study M under slight (or severe) perturbations. This is achieved studying
M when the valuation E is modified strategically. The first component of our proposal is a
description of the perceived potential perturbations in the model. Recall that in our approach
we want to consider positive and negative aspects by means of the two agents a and d. These
agents act over the model by changing the values of some of the exogenous components inside
the limits of our analysis of reality.
Definition 3. Let M be a macroeconomic model and let E be the set of its exogenous com-
ponents. A perturbation strength model for E is a set of S of pairs of real numbers, i.e.,
S = {(δa(e), δd(e)) | e ∈ E} describing the potential changes that can be applied to the valua-
tions of the exogenous components by a and d.
Observe that perturbations are real numbers, so they can be either positive or negative.
In order to provide intuition on the use of a perturbation strength model let us describe the
roles of a and d through some examples.
Example 4.1. A perturbation strength model S for the IS-LM Model E given in Example 3.1
is:
agent a b c, d, e, f T G M P
a 0 +1/20 0 0 +50 0 0
d 0 0 0 +50 −25 0 +1
Let us consider the roles of a and d separately. The angel a has the ability to act upon
the parameters {b,G}. The marginal propensity to consume could be increased from 3/4 to
4/5. This is modeled by δa(b) = 1/20. The government spending G might be increased by
δa(G) = 50. For any other e ∈ E \ {b,G}, a has no possibility of acting upon and therefore
δa(e) = 0. The daemon d has the ability to act upon some of the parameters in {P, T,G}.
The price of goods could increase by δd(P ) = 1; taxes could increase δd(T ) = 50; spending
could decrease by δd(G) = −25. Again, for e ∈ E \ {P, T,G}, δd(e) = 0. In this case, who
are a and d? Are they policy makers? Clearly a cannot be a policy maker because a policy
maker cannot influence upon the propensity to consume. As we said before, both a and d are
the two faces of the system analyser trying to give values to the possible ”perturbations” of
the system. The analyser also need to precise if the perturbations will act positively (like a)
or negatively (like d) over the system. 
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Example 4.2. In this example a and d can perturb the predetermined variables V in the
IS-MP model given in Example 3.2. One perturbation strength model S is
agent α, ρ, φ, θpi, θY π
∗ Y ǫ v
a 0 0 +25 +2 0
d 0 +3 0 0 +2
In S , a can potentially act over Y and ǫ. That is δa(Y ) = 25 and δa(ǫ) = 2 but, for any other
e ∈ {α, ρ, φ, θpi , θY , π
∗, v}, δa(e) = 0. d can potentially act over π
∗ and v with δd(π
∗) = 3 and
δd(v) = 2, all other δd(e) = 0.
The concrete valuations of E under perturbation strength model S depend on the par-
ticular selection of components to be perturbed performed by a and d. For a set s ⊆ E , #s
denotes the number of components in s.
Definition 4. Consider a model M having exogenous components E under a perturbation
strength model S. Given a joint action (a, d) with a, d ⊆ E. The valuation under strength E ′
of E given S and (a, d) is noted strengthS(E)[a, d] and it is defined as follows. For any e ∈ E,
strengthS(e)[a, d] = e+ δS(e)[a, d] where
δS(e)[a, d] =


0 e /∈ a ∪ d
δa(e) e ∈ a \ d
δd(e) e ∈ d \ a
δa(e) + δd(e) e ∈ a ∩ d
finally, strengthS(E)[a, d] = {strengthS(e)[a, d] | e ∈ E}.
As we said before, there is a convention in empirical work to measure risk and uncer-
tainty by historical standard deviation. Assume that e ∈ E is estimated statistically having
expectation µe and standard deviation σe (Arratia, 2014). The values µe and σe, can be
used to define different perturbation strength models. We focus on different possible cases
(even if they are unlikely). Assume that initially we take for the propensity to consume
the value b = µb. If we are interested in modeling a case where consumption is over the
mean µe and we feel that this is good (for people), we take a as the agent which can po-
tentially increase the estimation of the consumption by setting δa(b) = σb. In such a case,
the modeled system behaves with a propensity to consume b′ = µb + δa(b) = µe + σe. If
we like to model the case where consumption is ”slightly” under the mean and we feel that
this is not so good, we can take δd(b) = −σb/2 and b
′ = µe + δd(b) = µe − σb/2 (assuming
µe > σb/2). Finally, we could consider a situation in which both cases are possible together
into b′ = µe + δa(b) + δd(b) = µe + σe/2.
Observe that in the previous case a and d are far from being policy makers. They just
provide a way to focus on possible system behaviours. However, it is also possible to frame
this approach into a policies. Consider a policy maker liking to know the possible effects of a
tax change. Suppose that he is uncertain about the effects of a tax change δT > 0. When the
tax increase is considered good, we can take δa(T ) = δT and δd(T ) = −δT . In the opposite
case (decreasing taxes is a good thing), we can take δa(T ) = −δT and δd(T ) = δT .
Finally, a last important case remains to be considered. Imagine an analyser (or a planner)
aiming to look at the resilience of a systems under some new and quite open future situation.
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Note that this future situation might not be ”the one more likely to happen” (according to
the planner opinion). It could be a strange, rather unlikely but extremely dangerous (or
extremely favourable) situation. Therefore a S model is a way to study the strength of the
system under such situation. Thus, S it might or might not be derived from a statistical
study or a policy plan. It is precisely the task of the analyser to frame the future uncertainty
into a perturbation strength model providing the potential actions that a and d can perform
on the parameters.
Let us move to the computation of the equilibrium point in the valuation obtained after
a joint action (a, d) of the two agents, denoted as (Y (strengthS(E)[a, d]), r(strengthS(E)[a, d]).
When S is clear from the context, and we want to emphasize the role of the choice of parame-
ters (a, d) we note strengthS(E)[a, d] as E(a, d) and the equilibrium point as (Y (a, d), r(a, d)).
The following result points out some basic properties between the different components: E ,
S, (a, d) and strength. In particular, it analyzes explicitly some cases where parts of the
system (or the whole system) remains unchanged. In other words, when in S no unattended
modifications can appear.
Lemma 1. Let M be a model having exogenous components E under a perturbation strength
model S and consider a joint action (a, d). Then strengthS(e)[a, d] = e if and only if either e /∈
a∪ d or δa(e) = δd(e) = 0. The whole system remains unperturbed, i.e. strengthS(E)[a, d] = E
when S = {(0, 0) | e ∈ E} or (a, d) = (∅, ∅).
Proof. Let (a, d) be a joint action. For e′ ∈ E(a, d), according to Definition 4, we have
e′ = e + δS(e)[a, d]. Thus, e
′ = e if and only if δS(e)[a, d] = 0 and therefore. The later
condition is equivalent to δa(e) = δd(e) = 0 or e /∈ a ∪ d. The second part of the statement
follows trivially from this fact and the definitions.
In the following example we provide an application of the Definition 4 to the IS-LM model.
Example 4.3. We continue with Examples 3.1 and 4.1 under the joint action (a, d) =
({b}, {P,G}). After the joint action we get a new valuation, letting E ′ = E({b}, {P,G})
and e′ = strength(e)[{b}, {P,G}].
We have E ′ = strengthS(E)[{b}, {P,G}] = {a
′, b′, c′, d′, e′, f ′, T ′, G′,M ′, P ′}. The valua-
tions E and the computation of E ′ is sketched in the following table.
agent choice a b c d e f T G M P
200 3/4 200 25 1 100 100 100 1000 2
a a = {b} +1/20
d d =
{P,G}
−25 +1
a′ b′ c′ d′ e′ f ′ T ′ G′ M ′ P ′
200 4/5 200 25 1 100 100 75 1000 3
Observe that in the joint action a acts over the marginal propensity to consume b and d
acts (at the same time) over the price index P and the exogenous government spending G.
As a ∪ d = {b, P,G}, in the tuple E ′ = E({b}, {P,G}) only the values corresponding to the
components b, P and G are perturbed. The other parameters remain unchanged. According to
Definition 4 and Lemma 1, e = e′ for e ∈ E\{b, P,G} and e′ = e+δS(e)[a, d] for e ∈ {b, P,G}.
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Taking into account the perturbation strength model S we get
b′ = b+ δa(b) = 3/4 + 1/20 = 4/5,
P ′ = P + δd(P ) = 2 + 1 = 3,
G′ = G+ δd(G) = 100− 25 = 75.
Finally, the equilibrium point corresponding to E({b}, {P,G}) is Y ({b}, {P,G}) = 28700/27 ≈
1062.96, r({b}, {P,G}) = 197/27 ≈ 7.29. 
When M is perturbed from valuation E into E ′ by joint action (a, d), we would like to
isolate the effects of the the perturbation by expressing the equilibrium point (Y (a, d), r(a, d))
with respect to the non-perturbed equilibrium point (Y, r). In general this is difficult to
obtain, however, when an important part of E cannot be perturbed, we can take advantage
of the linear structure of the IS-LM and IS-MP models and get an explicit expression. In the
following lemmas we provide such expressions for some of such cases. Those results will be
used later on.
Lemma 2. Consider a perturbation strength model S for the IS-LM model such that, for
e ∈ {b, d, e, f, P}, we have δa(e) = δd(e) = 0. Let (a, d) be a joint action and define
δS(a, c,G, T )[a, d] = δS(a)[a, d] + δS(c)[a, d] + δS(G)[a, d] − b δS(T )[a, d].
Then, it holds(
Y (a, d)
r(a, d)
)
=
(
Y
r
)
+
1
g
(
f d/P
e − (1− b)/P
)(
δS(a, c,G, T )[a, d]
δS(M)[a, d]
)
Proof. As a and d cannot perturb components in {b, d, e, f, P}, the 2×2 matrix and the value
g = (1− b)f + de remain unchanged under S and any joint action (a, d). Therefore,
(
Y (a, d)
r(a, d)
)
=
1
g
(
f d/P
e − (1− b)/P
)(
a′ + c′ +G′ − bT ′
M ′
)
and we get
a′ + c′ +G′ − b T ′
= a+ c+G− b T + δS(a)[a, d] + δS(c)[a, d] + δS(G)[a, d] − b δS(T )[a, d]
= a+ c+G− b T + δS(a, c,G, T )[a, d],
M ′ =M + δS(M)[a, d].
Using straightforward linear algebra the result follows.
We are also interested in valuations E in relation to fiscal policies. In those situations only
T and G can suffer a perturbation. In such a case we get the following result.
Lemma 3. Consider a perturbation strength model S where {G,T} are the unique components
that can be perturbed. For a joint action (a, d), we have(
Y (a, d)
r(a, d)
)
=
(
Y
r
)
+
1
g
δS(G,T )[a, d]
(
f
e
)
where δS(G,T )[a, d] = δS(G)[a, d] − bδS(T )[a, d].
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Proof. As e ∈ {a, b, c, d, e, f,M,P} cannot be perturbed, i.e., δa(e) = δd(e) = 0. From Lemma
2, we have δS(M)[a, d] = 0. Therefore,
δS(a, c,G, T )[a, d] = δS(G)[a, d] − b δS(T )[a, d] = δS(G,T )[a, d]
and by computing the matrix product the result follows.
Our next result provides the equilibrium point in the IS-MP model when the exogenous
parameters cannot be perturbed.
Lemma 4. Consider a perturbation strength model S for the IS-MP model such that, for
e ∈ P, δa(e) = δd(e) = 0. For any joint action (a, d) it holds that(
Y (a, d)
π(a, d)
)
=
(
Y
π
)
+
(
γˆ − δˆ
ρˆ µˆ
)(
δS(ǫ)[a, d]
δS(v)[a, d]
)
+
(
δS(Y )[a, d]
δS(π
∗)[a, d]
)
.
Proof. As δS(e) = 0, for e ∈ {α, ρ, φ, θpi , θY }, δS(e)[a, d] = e. Therefore, the 2 × 2 matrix in
the expression for the equilibrium remains unchanged. Thus the values Y (a, d) and π(a, d)
can be expressed as(
Y (a, d)
π(a, d)
)
=
(
γˆ − δˆ
ρˆ µˆ
)(
ǫ+ δS(ǫ)[a, d]
v + δS(v)[a, d]
)
+
(
Y + δS(Y )[a, d]
π∗ + δS(π
∗)[a, d]
)
and, by linearity, the result follows.
In Section 7 we will consider the case where only the income Y and the inflation π become
uncertain. For such a case we have the following expression for the perturbed equilibrium
point.
Lemma 5. Consider a perturbation strength model S for the IS-MP model such that, for
e ∈ E \ {Y , π∗}, we have δa(e) = δd(e) = 0. For any joint action (a, d), it holds Y (a, d) =
Y + δS(Y )[a, d] and π(a, d) = π + δS(π
∗)[a, d].
Proof. Observe that E \ {Y , π∗} = P ∪ {ǫ, v}. As, for e ∈ P, δa(e) = δd(e) = 0 we can use
Lemma 4. Thus, we get(
Y (a, d)
π(a, d)
)
=
(
Y
π
)
+
(
γˆ − δˆ
ρˆ µˆ
)(
δS(ǫ)[a, d]
δS(v)[a, d]
)
+
(
δS(Y )[a, d]
δS(π
∗)[a, d]
)
As δa(e) = δd(e) = 0, for any e ∈ {ǫ, v}, we have δS(ǫ)[a, d] = δS(v)[a, d] = 0 and the claimed
result follows.
We conclude this section with an example illustrating the details of the computation of
the equilibrium point in a perturbed scenario.
Example 4.4. Let us continue with the Example 4.2 in the IS-MP model. Consider the joint
action (a, d) = ({ǫ}, {π∗, v}). Writing the new values as e′ = strength(e)[({ǫ}, {π∗ , v}]. As
usual,
E ′ = E({ǫ}, {π∗, v}) = {α′, ρ′, φ′, θ′pi, θ
′
Y , π
∗′, Y
′
, ǫ′, v′}.
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A sketch of the computation of the perturbed valuation is given in the following table.
agent choice α ρ φ θpi θY π
∗ Y ǫ v
1 2 1/4 1/2 1/2 2 100 1 1/2
a a = {ǫ} +2
d d =
{π∗, v}
+3 +2
α′ ρ′ φ′ θ′pi θ
′
Y π
∗′ Y
′
ǫ′ v′
1 2 1/4 1/2 1/2 5 100 3 5/2
As ǫ ∈ a \ d, according to the Definition 4 we have
ǫ′ = strength(ǫ)[({ǫ}, {π∗, v}] = ǫ+ δS [{ǫ}, {π
∗, v}] = ǫ+ δa(ǫ) = 3.
As π ∈ d \ a, π∗′ = π + δd(π
∗) = 5. Similarly v′ = v + δd(v) = 5/2. All other values remain
unchanged. In order to obtain (Y ′, π∗′) = (Y (a, d), π(a, d)), by using Lemma 4, we have(
Y ′
π′
)
=
1
13
(
1306
34
)
+
1
13
(
8 − 4
2 12
)(
δa(ǫ)
δd(v)
)
+
(
0
δa(π
∗)
)
=
1
13
(
1314
101
)
.
5 Uncertainty Profiles and a/d games
In this section, we present the model and tools to analyse a situation under a given perturba-
tion strength model. Recall that the perturbation strength model fixes the perturbation to the
different exogenous components. Following Gabarro et al. (2014), we introduce uncertainty
profiles as a tool to provide an a priori (global and macroscopic) view of the macroeconomic
model under perturbation. An uncertainty profile describes a priori situation where we are
uncertain over the specific location where the perturbation will impact the system but we
have an approximate idea of the extension of the perturbation. Uncertainty profiles are based
in three components. The first one identifies the set of exogenous components that might
be perturbed. The second states the limits in the number of components that can suffer
perturbation. The third component quantifies (as function of the exogenous components) the
benefits for the agents. In such a setting, we are uncertain about the specific subset that will
suffer the perturbation.
Definition 5. Let M be a macroeconomic model having E as set of exogenous components.
Let S be a perturbation strength model for M. An uncertainty profile is a tuple U =
〈E ,S,A,D, ba, bd, ua, ud〉 where A,D ⊆ E. The spread of the perturbation ba and bd, ver-
ify ba ≤ #A and similarly bd ≤ #D. The exerted perturbation follows from joint actions
(a, d) verifying a ⊆ A, d ⊆ D with #a = ba and #d = bd. The effects of a joint action are
measured by the utility functions ua and ud. Given a joint action (a, d), ua(a, d) measures a’s
gain while ud(a, d) measures d’s gain.
The analyser has the perception that, when an angelic component belonging to A is
perturbed, it is unlikely to have a malicious impact. In contrast, when a daemonic component
in D is perturbed, it might well have catastrophic implications. Note that, both A and D
13
determine the potential parameters to be perturbed. In many cases the analyser do not expect
that all of them are perturbed ”at the same time”. Thus, ba gives the number of components
in A that can be perturbed together. In a similar way bd gives the limitations for the d.
Uncertainty profiles provide a flexible analysis tool. Let us consider some cases of interest.
A really pessimistic and global approach like ”anything can go wrong” can be modelled taking
A = ∅ and D = E . Pessimism increases by selecting bigger values for bd. The Murphy’s law,
”anything that can go wrong will go wrong” translates directly as bd = #D. When the
perturbation of some component can go well or go wrong but not both at the same time, it
is enough to assume that A ∩ D = ∅. When we are uncertain about a component e and we
presume that it could suffer positive and negative influences at the same time, we can take
e ∈ A∩D. A completely optimistic perception can be modelled through A = E , D = ∅. Here
the degree of optimism is given by the value of ba. Setting A = D = E models a situation of
maximal uncertainty, the different degrees of perturbation, on both sides, are tuned trough
the values ba and bd. For instance, ba = #E and bd = #E forces the a and the d to act
perturbing simultaneously all the components in E .
The situation described by an uncertainty profile U is analyzed by means of an associated
strategic a/d game. In such a game a and d decide their actions strategically. For basics on
game theory we refer the reader to (Osborne, 2004; Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994)).
Definition 6. Let M be a macroeconomic model having E as set of exogenous components. Let
S be a perturbation strength model for M. Let U = 〈E ,S,A,D, ba, bd, ua, ud〉 be an uncertainty
profile. The associated angel-daemon strategic game (the a/d game) Γ(U) is defined as Γ(U) =
〈{a, d}, Aa, Ad, ua, ud〉. Γ(U) has two players {a, d}. The player’s actions are Aa = {a ⊆
A | #a = ba} and Ad = {d ⊆ D | #d = bd}. Their utilities are ua and ud.
Notice that, in an a/d game the set of strategy profiles is Aa ×Ad. Thus strategy profiles
are permissible joint actions. Recall that, a pure Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile such
that neither a nor d can improve the situation by himself (Osborne, 2004). Formally, a
strategy profile (a, d) is a pure Nash equilibrium if and only if ua(a, d) ≥ ua(a
′, d), for all
a′ ∈ Aa, and ud(a, d) ≥ ud(a, d
′), for all d′ ∈ Ad. We note by PNE(Γ) the set of pure Nash
equilibria of Γ. When Γ is clear from the context we just write PNE. Given d ∈ Ad the
best response of a to d’s choice d is the set of strategies giving to a the maximum utility,
i.e., Ba(d) = {a | ua(a, d) ≥ ua(a
′, d) for all a′ ∈ Aa}. Similarly, Bd(a) = {d | ud(a, d) ≥
ud(a, d
′) for all d′ ∈ Ad}. It is well known that (a, d) ∈ PNE if and only if a ∈ Ba(d) and
b ∈ Bd(a). Formally, PNE = {(a, d) | a ∈ Ba(d) and b ∈ Bd(a)}.
In the following we analyze the existence of PNE for some extreme types of uncertainty
profiles.
Lemma 6. Let U = 〈E ,S,A,D, ba, bd, ua, ud〉 be an uncertainty profile for M. When ba = #A
and bd = #D, the only PNE of Γ(U) is (A,D). When ba = 0 and bd = 0, the only PNE of
Γ(U) is is (∅, ∅).
Proof. In the first case, the only permissible joint action is (A,D), In the second case (∅, ∅)
is the unique permissible joint strategy. Therefore, in both cases, there is only one possible
strategy profile and the result follows.
The previous lemma considers two extreme cases where neither a nor d have freedom to
make choices. Our next result shows that in an equilibrium, when one of the two agents
cannot act, the other agent maximizes his utility.
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Lemma 7. Let U = 〈E ,S,A,D, ba, bd, ua, ud〉 be an uncertainty profile for M. When bd =
0 it holds PNE(Γ(U)) = {(a, ∅) | ua(a, ∅) = maxa′∈Aa ua(a
′, ∅)}. When ba = 0 it holds
PNE(Γ(U)) = {(∅, d) | ud(∅, d) = maxd′∈Ad ud(∅, d
′)}.
Proof. In the first case we have Aa ×Ad = {(a, ∅) | a ⊆ A and #a = ba}. Symmetrically, in
the second case we have Aa × Ad = {(∅, d) | d ⊆ D and #d = bd}. The claim follows from
the definition of PNE.
Let us present some examples of a/d games arising in the analysis of uncertainty profiles
for the IS-LM and the IS-MP models. We have selected them to illustrate some aspects
related to the existence of PNE in the associated a/d game.
Example 5.1. Take M = IS-LM, the valuation E given in Example 3.1 and the perturba-
tion strength model S introduced in Example 4.1. We will define A and D depending on the
uncertain scenario we are interested to describe. Consider a situation in which we are inter-
ested to know how perturbations affects Y and r when the marginal propensity to consume
might be perturbed in an angelic way while the price of goods and taxes might be perturbed
in a daemonic way. However, the exogenous government spending might be perturbed in both
directions. In consequence we set A = {b,G} and D = {P,G, T}. Assume that we do not
expect perturbations to be exerted at the same time on more than one component. So, we
set ba = bd = 1. We are interested to know how perturbations affects Y and r. So, we take
ua = Y and we need to precise the interests of d with respect to r. In general, a low interest
rate r is a mean to achieve higher economic growth and lower unemployment. Now we explore
two cases.
First, we want to catch a “worst-case” situation where the perturbation increases the
interest rate. The dictum, “having hight interest rate is bad” is captured by setting ud = r. In
this case, d tries to maximize r. The uncertainty profile U1 = 〈E ,S, {b,G}, {P,G, T}, 1, 2, Y, r〉
mimics an uncertain situation asking at the same time for a hight income and a high interest
rate. Second, we consider a “best-case” situation. As raising interest rate r has negative
effects, we are interested to know what happens when this is not the case. So, r is considered
a dis-utility. Raising r is seen as a negative fact. Thus we define ud = −r (note that
maximizing −r is the same as minimizing r). These considerations lead to the uncertainty
profile U2 = 〈E ,S, {b,G}, {P,G, T}, 1, 2, Y,−r〉.
Let us consider the first case, U1 = 〈E ,S, {b,G}, {P,G, T}, 1, 2, Y, r〉 and analyze the PNE
of the a/d game Γ(U1). According to the definitions, the set of actions for the players are
Aa = {a ⊆ {b,G} | #a = 1} = {{b}, {G}},
Ad = {d ⊆ {P,G, T} | #d = 2} = {{P,G}, {P, T}, {T,G}}
The utilities are ua = Y and ud = r which can be tabulated in the usual bi-matrix form.
Recall that a bi-matrix is a table with an entry for each strategy profile holding a pair of
values corresponding to the utilities of the two players. Computing the utilities of a and d
(according to the methods developed in Example 4.3), after applying the perturbation to the
selected components, we get, for example Y ({b}, {P,G}) ≈ 1062.96 and r({b}, {P,G}) ≈ 7.29.
The remaining results are summarized in the following bi-matrix representation of Γ(U1).
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d{P,G} {P, T} {T,G}
a
{b} 1062.96, 7.29 1029.62, 6.962 1233.33, 22/3 ≈ 7.33
{G} 1066.66, 22/3 ≈ 7.33 1041.66, 7.08 1075, 5.75
The sets of a’s best responses to d’s actions are:
Ba({P,G}) = {{G}}, Ba({P, T}) = {{G}}, Ba({T,G}) = {{b}}
and the sets of d’s best responses to a’s actions are:
Bd({b}) = {{T,G}}, Bd({G}) = {{P,G}}
The strategy profile ({G}, {P,G}) is a pure Nash equilibrium because {G} ∈ Ba({P,G}) and
{P,G} ∈ Bd({G}). Similarly, ({b}, {T,G}) ∈ PNE. So, we have
PNE = {({G}, {P,G}), ({b}, {T,G})}
The utilities for ({G}, {P,G}) are
ua({G}, {P,G}) = Y ({G}, {P,G}) = 1066.66
ud({G}, {P,G}) = r({G}, {P,G}) = 22/3 ≈ 7.33
and the utilities for ({b}, {T,G}) are
ua({b}, {T,G}) = Y ({b}, {T,G}) = 1233.33
ud({b}, {T,G}) = r({b}, {T,G}) = 22/3 ≈ 7.33
Thus, Γ(U1), has more than one PNE. Observe that a gets different rewards on these PNE.
In the second case we have U2 = 〈E ,S, {b,G}, {P,G, T}, 1, 2, Y,−r〉. The corresponding
a/d game Γ(U2) is described by the following bi-matrix form.
d
{P,G} {P, T} {T,G}
a
{b} 1062.96,−7.29 1029.62,−6.962 1233.33,−22/3 ≈ −7.33
{G} 1066.66,−22/3 ≈ −7.33 1041.66,−7.08 1075,−5.75
As a tries to maximize the outcome Y , their sets of best responses are the same as in
Γ(U1). As d tries to maximize −r (minimize r), their best responses are Bd({b}) = {{P, T}}
and Bd({G}) = {{T,G}}. Observe that in this case PNE = ∅. As there is no PNE, on
any joint strategy, one of the agents (or both), can unilaterally improve his situation. For
instance, suppose that initially the system is in ({b}, {P,G}). In this case, d has an incentive
to change strategy as Bd({b}) = {{P, T}}. Thus, moving to ({b}, {P, T}). This is denoted as
({b}, {P,G})
d
−→ ({b}, {P, T}). Then a can improve also his situation. This process give rise
to an unstable never-ending behaviour.
({b}, {P,G})
d
−→ ({b}, {P, T})
a
−→ ({G}, {P,G})
d
−→
({G}, {T,G})
a
−→ ({b}, {T,G})
d
−→ ({b}, {P, T})
a
−→ · · ·
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We have considered two cases dealing with opposite interests on r. Many other cases might be
of interest, for example when a tries to minimize Y and d tries to maximize r. In any case,
the analyser should transform a perception about uncertainty into one (or several) uncertainty
profiles. 
Example 5.2. Let us continue with the Examples 4.2 and 4.4 of the IS-MP model. We
consider the uncertainty profiles where ua = Y and analyze the situations in which d has
opposite interests in the inflation π. We consider again two uncertainty profiles in which
the agents have a narrow spread of perturbation: U1 = 〈E ,S, {ǫ, Y }, {v, π
∗}, 1, 1, Y, π〉 and
U2 = 〈E ,S, {ǫ, Y }, {v, π
∗}, 1, 1, Y,−π〉.
Computing the utilities as in Example 4.4, for instance Y ({ǫ}, {v}) = 13014/13 and
π({ǫ}, {v}) = 62/13, we get the following bi-matrix form for Γ(U1).
d
{v} {π∗}
a
{ǫ} 1314/13, 62/13 1322/13, 77/13
{Y } 1623/13, 58/13 1631/13, 73/13
As before, we compute the sets of best responses: Ba({v}) = Ba({π
∗}) = {{Y }} and
Bd({ǫ}) = Bd({Y }) = {{π
∗}}. Observe that the game has a unique pure Nash equilibrium.
Thus, PNE = {({Y }, {π∗})}.
For U2 = 〈E ,S, {ǫ, Y }, {v, π
∗}, 1, 1, Y,−π〉 the a/d game Γ(U2) is described as follows.
d
{v} {π∗}
a
{ǫ} 1314/13,−62/13 1322/13,−77/13
{Y } 1623/13,−58/13 1631/13,−73/13
The sets of d’s best responses are Bd({ǫ}) = Bd({Y }) = {{v}}. So, PNE = {({Y }, {v})}.
In view of the previous examples an important question is whether we can characterize
uncertainty profiles with respect to the existence of PNE in the associated a/d game. In the
following section we provide such an answer for particular cases generalizing the situations
presented in the previous examples. Now we turn our attention to the more general notion
of mixed Nash equilibrium.
It is well know that although a strategic game might not have a PNE, it always has a
Nash equilibrium on mixed strategies (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994). So, from the a/d game,
the stable perturbed situations are described by the mixed strategies of the players in the
Nash equilibria. A mixed strategies for a player is a probability distribution on its set of
actions. Thus in an a/d game, a mixed strategy profile is a tuple (α, β) where α : Aa → [0, 1]
and β : Ad → [0, 1] are probability distributions. The utility for player p ∈ {a, d} of a mixed
strategy profile (α, β) is defined as
up(α, β) =
∑
(a,d)∈Aa×Ad
α(a)β(d)up(a, d)
The following example illustrates the notion of mixed strategy.
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Example 5.3. We provide an example of mixed strategies, for the game Γ(U1) defined in
Example 5.1. Let (α, β) a mixed strategy for Γ(U1).
As Aa = {{b}, {G}} we can describe α as a function that assigns probability x to {b} and
probability 1− x to {G}, for some 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. We represent such a function as
α =
(
α({b}), α({G})
)
= (x, 1 − x) with 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
As Ad = {{P,G}, {P, T}, {T,G}} we can describe a probability distribution on Ad as
β =
(
β({P,G}), β({P, T}), β({T,G})
)
= (y, z, 1 − y − z) with 0 ≤ y, z ≤ 1 and y + z ≤ 1
We can represent a generic mixed strategy profile using the bi-matrix form of Γ(U1) and adding
the probabilities of each action.
d
{P,G} {P, T} {T,G}
y z 1− y − z
a
{b} x 1062.96, 7.29 1029.62, 6.962 1233.33, 22/3 ≈ 7.33
{G} 1− x 1066.66, 22/3 ≈ 7.33 1041.66, 7.08 1075, 5.75
The utility, for p ∈ {a, d}, is computed as
up(α, β) = α({b})β({P,G})up({b}, {P,G}) + · · ·
· · ·+ α({G})β({T,G})up({G}, {T,G})
In particular setting x = 1/3, y = 1/4 and z = 1/2. The strategy profile is (α, β) =(
(1/3, 2/3), (1/4, 1/2, 1/4)
)
and the utilitities for the two players are
ua(α, β) =
1
3
×
1
4
× 1062.96 + · · · = 1067.124
ud(α, β) =
1
3
×
1
4
× 7.29 + · · · = 6.9195 
Let ∆a and ∆d denote the set of mixed strategies for players a and d, respectively. A pure
strategy profile (a, d) is a special case of a mixed strategy profile (α, β) in which α(a) = 1 and
β(d) = 1. The definition of Nash equilibrium extends the conditions for pure strategies to
mixed strategies. We adapt to a/d games the characterization of a mixed Nash equilibrium
given in (Osborne, 2004) that we will use to prove that some mixed strategies are Nash
equilibria.
Property 8. A mixed strategy profile (α, β) is a mixed Nash equilibrium in Γ(U) if the
following two symmetric conditions hold. For all a ∈ Aa, when α(a) > 0 we have ua(α, β) =
ua(a, β), otherwise ua(α, β) ≥ ua(a, β). For all d ∈ Ad, when β(d) > 0 we have ud(α, β) =
ud(α, d), otherwise ud(α, β) ≥ ud(α, d).
In the following example we use this characterization to obtain a mixed Nash equilibrium.
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Example 5.4. Let us continue with the Example 5.1. We have seen that the a/d game
corresponding to U2 = 〈E ,S, {b,G}, {P,G, T}, 1, 2, Y,−r〉 has no PNE. Let us compute a
mixed Nash equilibrium. An strategy α ∈ ∆a can be described as α = (α({b}), α({G})) =
(x, 1− x) with 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. As d is rational, d will never choose {P,G} because, independently
of a’s action, {P, T} or ({T,G}) provide better utility. Therefore, according to Property 8,
β({P,G}) = 0 in any Nash equilibria (α, β). Therefore, we can restrict our search to β ∈ ∆d
having the form
β = (β({P,G}), β({P, T}), β({T,G})) = (0, y, 1 − y),
for 0 ≤ y ≤ 1. Using property 8 we can express the d utilities and the conditions for such an
(α, β) to be a mixed Nash equilibrium.
ud(α, {P,G}) = −x× 7.29 − (1− x)×
22
3
= 0.04333333 × x− 7.333333
ud(α, {P, T}) = −x× 6.962 − (1− x)× 7.08 = 0.118 × x− 7.08
ud(α, {T,G}) = −x×
22
3
− (1− x)× 5.75 = −1.583333 × x− 5.75
ud(α, {P,G}) ≤ ud(α, {P, T}) = ud(α, {T,G})
The equality ud(α, {P, T}) = ud(α, {T,G}) determines α = (0.78174, 0.21826)
To obtain the value of y we state the utilities and conditions for a.
ua({b}, β) = y × 1029.62 + (1− y)× 1233.33 = −203.71 × y + 1233.33
ua({G}, β) = y × 1041.66 + (1− y)× 1075 = −33.34 × y + 1075
To get a Nash equilibrium we need ua({b}, β) = ua({G}, β) then
β = (0, 0.9293303, 0.07066972).
Therefore, (α, β) = ((0.78174, 0.21826), (0, 0.9293303, 0.07066972) is a mixed Nash equi-
librium for Γ(U2). Finally, we can compute the players’ utilities in such an equilibrium:
ua(α, β) = x× y × 1029.62 + x× (1− y)× 1233.33 + (1− x)× y × 1041.66
+ (1− x)× (1− y)× 1075 = 1044.016
ud(α, β) =− x ∗ y ∗ 6.962 − x ∗ (1− y) ∗ (22/3) − (1− x) ∗ y ∗ 7.08
− (1− x) ∗ (1− y) ∗ 5.75 = −6.98775

As we have seen in the previous examples games can have more than one Nash equilibrium
and get different utilities in those situations. This property does not happen in the case of
two players zero-sum games (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). In a zero-sum game, the
sum of the utilities of both players is always zero. A zero-sum game can have several Nash
equilibria but all of them provide the same utility for the players. As all the Nash equilibria
have the same utility for the first player, this utility is called the value of the game.
To obtain a zero-sum a/d game, we need uncertainty profiles where ud + ua = 0. We
can model this situation by considering a unique objective function u so that ua = u and
ud = −u. In such a case the angelic and daemonic interests go exactly in opposite directions.
In a zero-sum situation we simplify notation. In an uncertainty profile we introduce only the
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function u: U = 〈E ,S,A,D, ba, bd, u〉. The description of the corresponding zero-sum a/d is
done by providing the table with the u values, replacing the usual bi-matrix form. The value
of the game Γ(U) is denoted by ν(U) and it can be expressed as
ν(U) = min
α∈∆a
max
β∈∆d
u(α, β) = max
β∈∆d
min
α∈∆a
u(α, β)
One natural way to get a zero-sum situation associated to a given uncertainty profile
U = 〈E ,S,A,D, ba, bd, ua, ud〉, is to consider a strategy profile (a, d) as a perturbation of
the strategy profile (∅, ∅). One way of doing so is to consider the uncertainty profile U ′ =
〈E ,S,A,D, ba, bd, u〉 where
u(a, d) = ua(a, d) −
ua(∅, ∅)
ud(∅, ∅)
ud(a, d).
In the following examples we analyze the values of such games derived from uncertainty
profiles on the IS-LM and the IS-MP models considered before.
Example 5.5. Consider the uncertainty profile U = 〈E ,S, {b,G}, {P,G, T}, 1, 2, u〉 with
u(a, d) = Y (a, d) − Y (∅,∅)
r(∅,∅) r(a, d) for the IS-LM model derived from the uncertainty profile
considered in Example 3.1. Recall that the system’s solution is (Y, r) = (1100, 6). Accord-
ing to Lemma 1, when (a, d) = (∅, ∅) it holds (Y (∅, ∅), r(∅, ∅)) = (Y, r) = (1100, 6) therefore
u(a, d) = Y (a, d) − 11006 r(a, d). Simplifying u(a, d) = Y (a, d) −
550
3 r(a, d). The corresponding
zero-sum a/d game Γ(U) is described by the table of u:
d
{P,G} {P, T} {T,G}
a
{b} −22250/81 ≈ −274.69 −20000/81 ≈ −246.91 −1000/9 ≈ −111.11
{G} −2500/9 ≈ −277.77 −4625/18 ≈ −256.94 125/6 ≈ 20.83
Observe that there is one PNE at ({b}, {P,G}), therefore we know that all NE will provide
the same utility and that ν(U) = −22250/81. 
Example 5.6. Let us reconsider the Example 5.2. This leads to the zero-sum e uncertainty
profile U = 〈E ,S, {ǫ, Y },D = {v, π∗}, 1, 1, u〉 where u(a, d) = Y (a, d)−(Y (∅, ∅)/π(∅, ∅))π(a, d).
According to Example 3.2, Y (∅, ∅) = 1306/13 and π(∅, ∅) = 34/13. In this case Γ(U) is
described by the following table.
d
{v} {π∗}
a
{ǫ} −1396/17 ≈ −82.11 −2139/17 ≈ −125.82
{Y } −791/17 ≈ −46.52 −1534/17 ≈ −90.23
The sets of best responses are Ba({v}) = Ba({π∗}) = {{Y }} and Bd({ǫ}) = Bd({Y }) =
{{π∗}}. There is a PNE ({Y }, {π∗}) and therefore the value of the game is ν(U) = −1534/17 ≈
−90.23.
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6 Uncertainty in the IS-LM Model
We consider the case in which a perturbation is exerted only on the fiscal policy, i.e., A = D =
{G,T}. Furthermore, we assume also that a and d can control just one of the components.
We analyze two situations with respect to the utilities. In the first case a’s objective is to
increase the income as much as possible while d tries to increase the interest rate. In the
second case we considerer a zero-sum approach taking u = Y − k r.
6.1 A Case of Fiscal Policy under Uncertainty in the IS-LM Model
Consider the case where a and d have the capability to act over T and G, that is Aa =
Ad = {{T}, {G}} and ua = Y and ud = r (as it was the case in Example 5.1). We ask if
the addition of uncertainty can generate a situation in which no PNE exists. We provide
a negative answer. Before stating the result. Let us remind, in the context of a/d games,
the definition of dominant strategy equilibrium (DSE) taken from (Osborne & Rubinstein,
1994). A DSE is a joint action (a, d) such that, for any other joint action (a′, d′) ∈ Aa ×Ad,
ua(a, d
′) ≥ ua(a
′, d′) and ud(a
′, d) ≥ ud(a
′, d′). As pointed out in (Osborne & Rubinstein,
1994), in a DSE, the action of every player is a best response independently on which are
the actions taken by the other players. Our next result proves the existence of DSE when
the perturbation has to be exerted only in one component
Theorem 9. Let S be a perturbation strength model, for the IS-LM model, given by
agent a, b, c, d, e, f T G M,P
a 0 δa(T ) δa(G) 0
d 0 δd(T ) δd(G) 0
For the uncertainty profile U = 〈E ,S, {G,T}, {G,T}, 1, 1, Y, r〉, the associated a/d game Γ(U)
in bi-matrix form is given by
d
{T} {G}
a
{T}
ua = Y −
f
g
b(δa(T ) + δd(T )) ua = Y +
f
g
(δd(G)− bδa(T ))
ud = r −
e
g
b(δa(T ) + δd(T )) ud = r +
e
g
(δd(G) − bδa(T ))
{G}
ua = Y +
f
g
(δa(G) − bδd(T )) ua = Y +
f
g
(δa(G) + δd(G))
ud = r +
e
g
(δa(G)− bδd(T )) ud = r +
e
g
(δa(G) + δd(G))
Furthermore, it holds that Γ(U) has always a DSE.
Proof. Observe that, in S, δa(x) = δd(x) = 0, for x /∈ {G,T}. Furthermore, in Γ(U) as
A = {T,G} but ba = 1, the angel a has only the possibility to act over one parameter
therefore Aa = {{T}, {G}} and similarly for d. Thus, in Γ(U) the sets of actions are Aa =
Ad = {{T}, {G}}. As ua(a, d) = Y (a, d) and ud(a, d) = r(a, d) the a/d game is
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d{T} {G}
a
{T} Y ({T}, {T}), r({T}, {T}) Y ({T}, {G}), r({T}, {G})
{G} Y ({G}, {T}), r({G}, {T}) Y ({G}, {G}), r({G}, {G})
According to Lemma 3
Y (a, d) = Y +
f
g
δS(G,T )[a, d], r(a, d) = r +
e
g
δS(G,T )[a, d].
To find the values Y (a, d) and r(a, d) we need to compute the values of δS(G,T )[a, d] =
δS(G)[a, d] − bδS(T )[a, d]. For instance, when (a, d) = ({T}, {T}), according to Definition 4,
δS(G)[{T}, {T}] = 0, δS(T )[{T}, {T}] = δa(T ) + δd(T ) and δS(G,T )[{T}, {T}] = −b(δa(T ) +
δd(T )). The other cases are δS(G,T )[{T}, {G}] = δd(G) − bδa(T ), δS(G,T )[{G}, {T}] =
δa(G)−bδd(T ) and δS(G,T )[{G}, {G}] = δa(G)+δd(G). From those computations we conclude
that the bi-matrix form of the a/d corresponds to the statement.
In order to analyse the structure of Nash equilibria, let us study best responses by case
analysis. Consider a’s utility increment when d is in {T} and a moves from {T} to {G}
written as T → G.
ua({G}, {T}) − ua({T}, {T}) = Y ({G}, {T}) − Y ({T}, {T})
= (f/g)
(
δS(G,T )[{G}, {T}] − δS(G,T )[{T}, {T}]
)
= (f/g)(bδa(T ) + δa(G))
Defining µa,T→G = bδa(T ) + δa(G)) we write ua({G}, {T}) − ua({T}, {T}) = (f/g)µa,T→G.
We see that, abstracting from factor f/g, the expression µa,T→G measures the increment
(in particular the sign) of a’s utility. Due to the linear structure of the model, µd,T→G =
bδd(T ) + δd(G)) also makes sense to measures d’s increment. We prove the following claim:
given p ∈ {a, d} and defining µp,T→G = bδp(T ) + δp(G) it holds that
Bp({T}) = Bp({G}) =


{G} if µp,T→G > 0
{T,G} if µp,T→G = 0
{T} if µp,T→G < 0
To prove the claim, we start with a and consider Ba({T}) and Ba({G}) separately. In order to
find Ba({T}), we know the change when a moves between {T} and {G}, but Y ({G}, {T}) −
Y ({T}, {T}) = (f/g)µa,T→G. For Ba({G}), we have also Y ({G}, {G}) − Y ({T}, {G}) =
(f/g)µa,T→G . Therefore, for d ∈ Ad, we have Y ({G}, d) − Y ({T}, d) = (f/g)µa,T→G. As
f/g > 0, we conclude that
Ba({T}) = Ba({G}) =


{G} if µa,T→G > 0
{T,G} if µa,T→G = 0
{T} if µa,T→G < 0
For d, we have r(a, {G}) − r(a, {T}) = (e/g)µd,T→G for a ∈ Aa. As e/g > 0, we obtain
Bd({T}) = Bd({G}) =


{G} if µd,T→G > 0
{T,G} if µd,T→G = 0
{T} if µd,T→G < 0
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As a and d have similar structure, taking any agent p ∈ {a, d}, the claim follows.
According to the best responses, by case analysis, we find the following PNE structure:
µa,T→G > 0 µa,T→G = 0 µa,T→G < 0
µd,T→G > 0 {G,G} {G,T},{G,G} {G,T}
µd,T→G = 0 {T,G} {G,G} {G,G}{G,T}{T,G}{T, T} {T, T}{G,T}
µd,T→G < 0 {T,G} {T, T}{T,G} {T, T}
To prove the existence of a DSE we consider first the case µp,T→G > 0, for p ∈ {a, d}. Let
us show that, in such a case, ({G}, {G}) is a dominant strategy equilibrium. When p = a the
conditions for DSE are ua({G}, d) ≥ ua({T}, d) for d ∈ Ad As for d ∈ Ad
ua({G}, d) − ua({T}, d) = (f/g)µa,T→G > 0
the constraint hold. When p = d the condition is ud(a, {G}) ≥ ud(a, {T}) for any a ∈ Aa. As
ud(a, {G}) − ud(a, {T}) = (e/g)µd,T→G > 0
constraints hold and ({G}, {G}) is a dominant strategy equilibrium when µa,T→G > 0. The
remaining cases follow by a similar argument.
In the situation analyzed on Theorem 9 there is the possibility of modifying government
spending or taxes. For both components there are positive and negative aspects, this is
model by the perturbation strength parameters δa(G), δd(G), δa(T ), and δd(T ). If we take
into account all the possible perturbed actions together we get that
Gˆ = G+ δa(G) + δd(G), Tˆ = T + δa(T ) + δd(T ).
In such a case, the income Yˆ and the interest rate rˆ are given by(
Yˆ
rˆ
)
=
1
g
(
f d/P
e − (1− b)/P
)(
a+ c+ Gˆ− b Tˆ
M
)
,
by linearity, we have(
Yˆ
rˆ
)
=
(
Y
r
)
+
(
δa(G) + δd(G)− bδa(T )− bδd(T )
)1
g
(
f
e
)
.
The use of Game Theory gives the opportunity to study this situation under different ”inter-
mediate” scenarios with a larger number of possibilities to consider. We adopted in Theorem
9 a moderate view respecting to goodness and badness: there is too much luck in assuming
that measures over G and T will be successful all together. This translates in the rule: it is
possible to apply δa(G) or δa(T ) but not both at the same time. Our point about badness is
similar, things are bad but not too bad, translating into similar rules for d’s actions. We are
not saying that it is not possible to simultaneously change government spending and taxation.
But if this is the case, the design of the uncertainty profile, and in consequence of the a/d
game, will be different.
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Let us comment Theorem 9. The possible results depends on µp,T→G for p ∈ {a, d}. Let
us consider some cases. When µp,T→G > 0 for p ∈ {a, d} the strategy profile ({G}{G}) is the
unique PNE with utilities
Y ({G}{G}) = Y +
f
g
(δa(G) + δd(G)), r({G}{G}) = Y +
e
g
(δa(G) + δd(G)).
In such a case, just government spending is a good policy rule. Note that perturbations
exerted to taxes (δa(T ), δd(T ) do not appear). Therefore, it seems better to keep taxes
unchanged. The relation between both approaches is given by(
Yˆ
rˆ
)
=
(
Y ({G}{G})
r({G}{G})
)
− b
(
δa(T ) + δd(T )
)1
g
(
f
e
)
.
Thus, depending on the sign of δa(T ) + δd(T ), one solution or the other one will be the best
one. When µp,T→G < 0, for p ∈ {a, d}, the strategy profile ({T}{T}) is the unique PNE. In
such a case taxing is the good solution and the relation between both approaches is given by(
Yˆ
rˆ
)
=
(
Y ({T}{T})
r({T}{T})
)
+
(
δa(G) + δd(G)
)1
g
(
f
e
)
.
An interesting case happens when µa,T→G > 0 and µd,T→G < 0. In this situation {T,G} is
the unique PNE with values
Y ({T}{G}) = Y +
f
g
(δd(G)− bδa(T )), r({T}{G}) = Y +
e
g
(δd(G) − bδa(T )).
Thus highlighting a case where both, government spending and taxing, will occur in equilib-
rium. Comparing with Yˆ and rˆ we have that(
Yˆ
rˆ
)
=
(
Y ({T}{T})
r({T}{T})
)
+
(
δa(G)− bδd(T )
)1
g
(
f
e
)
.
Uncertainty profiles help us to catch and deal with many intermediate cases between total
successfulness and complete failure. Note that uncertainty profiles are flexible tools. For
instance we can catch the solution Yˆ and rˆ with an uncertainty profile as we show in the
following example
Example 6.1. Take a perturbation strength model S as in Theorem 9 and consider the
uncertainty profile U = 〈E ,S, {T,G}, {T,G}, 2, 2, Y, r〉. Lemma 6 deals with this case having
({T,G}, {T,G}) as a unique PNE. The corresponding utilities are Yˆ and rˆ.
6.2 On Balanced Budgets
Now we consider an a/d approach to deal with balanced budgets. To do that, we take a special
case of the perturbation strength model S considered in Theorem 9 where the government
spends the amount δ collected by taxation. We call it Sbalanced ,
agent a, b, c, d, e, f T G M,P
a 0 0 δ 0
d 0 δ 0 0
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Consider the uncertainty profile Ubalanced = 〈E ,Sbalanced , {G,T}, {G,T}, 1, 1, Y,−r〉. From
Theorem 9, we easily get the following description for Γ(Ubalanced )
d
{T} {G}
a
{T} Y − f
g
bδ, −
(
r − e
g
bδ
)
Y , −r
{G} Y + f
g
δ(1 − b), −
(
r + e
g
δ(1 − δ)
)
Y + f
g
δ , −
(
r + e
g
δ
)
The sets of best responses are Ba({T}) = Ba({G}) = {G} and Bd({T}) = Bd({G}) = {T}.
The the only PNE is ({G}, {T}). This Nash equilibrium corresponds to the case where
Government spends the amount δ collected by taxes and this corresponds to a balanced
budget.
6.3 Direct Control over Income and Interest Rate from a and d
In various previous examples giving raise to non zero-sum games we have considered ua = Y
and ud = r. In such cases, the goal of a consists on maximize the Y (a good thing) while d
tries to maximize the interest (a bad thing). We consider now the case where a is interested
in controlling both, Y and r, directly. Informally a likes to keep Y as high as possible and
in order to get that r needs to be as small as possible. A way to model this situation is
to consider ua = Y − r. Now a is interested in increasing Y and decreasing r in order to
keep ua as high as possible. We can tune the relevance of Y in front of r using a parameter
k > 0 and defining ua(a, d) = Y (a, d) − k r(a, d). In the case that d is interested just in the
opposite, ud(a, d) = k r(a, d) − Y (a, d). Therefore, ua = −ud and Γ(U) is a zero sum game
with u(a, d) = ua(a, d). Our next results analyzes the PNE of a case of perturbed fiscal policy
where any effort undertaken by a can be cancelled by d and vice-versa, this can be modeled
by letting δa(T ) + δd(T ) = 0 and δa(G) + δd(G) = 0.
Theorem 10. Let S be a perturbation strength model for the IS-LM model given by
agent a, b, c, d, e, f T G M,P
a 0 δa(T ) = −δT δa(G) = δG 0
d 0 δd(T ) = δT δd(G) = −δG 0
Consider the uncertainty profile U = 〈E ,S, {T,G}, {T,G}, 1, 1, u〉 where u(a, d) = Y (a, d) −
k r(a, d), for some δT > 0 and δG ≥ 0. Letting δ = bδT − δG, the associated zero-sum a/d
game Γ(U) is given by
d
{T} {G}
a
{T} Y − k r (Y − k r) + (1/g)(f − k e)δ
{G} (Y − k r)− (1/g)(f − k e)δ Y − k r
When (f − k e)δ = 0, the four strategy profiles of Γ(U) are PNE, otherwise either
({T}, {T}) or ({G}, {G}) is the unique PNE of Γ(U) .
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Proof. Let us compute the utilities in Γ(U). We can easily get Y ({T}, {T}) = Y ({G}, {G}) =
Y and r({T}, {T}) = r({G}, {G}) = r. Recall that the expression of the equilibrium point is,
Y ({T}, {G}) =
f
g
(
a+ c+G− δG − b(T − δT )
)
+
d
g
M
P
= Y +
f
g
δ.
Thus, summarizing we have
Y ({T}, {G}) = Y + (f/g)δ, r({T}, {G}) = r + (e/g)δ,
Y ({G}, {T}) = Y − (f/g)δ, r({G}, {T}) = r − (e/g)δ.
Considering the utilities, clearly u({T}, {T}) = u({G}, {G}) = Y − k r and
u({T}, {G}) = Y ({T}, {G}) − k r({T}, {G})
= Y + (f/g)δ − k(r + (e/g)δ) = Y − k r + (1/g)(f − k e)δ.
In a similar way u({G}, {T}) = (Y − k r)− (1/g)(f − k e)δ and we get the claimed expression
for Γ(U). Let us analyze the structure of the PNE. When (f−k e)δ = 0 all the pure strategies
have the same utility Y − k r and therefore all of them are PNE. When Y − k r > 0 and
(f − k e)δ > 0 the only PNE is ({T}, {T}). When Y − k r > 0 and (f − k e)δ < 0 the only
PNE is ({G}, {G}). When Y −k r < 0 and (f −k e)δ > 0 the only PNE is ({T}, {T}). When
Y − k r < 0 and (f − k e)δ < 0 the only PNE is ({G}, {G}).
When k = Y/r, reconsidering Example 5.1 taking u(a, d) = Y (a, d) − (Y/r)r(a, d) and
Theorem 10, we have that Γ(U) is
d
{T} {G}
a
{T} 0 (1/g)(f − (Y/r)e)δ
{G} −(1/g)(f − (Y/r)e)δ 0
When u({T}, {G}) > 0, the game has a PNE in ({T}, {T}). When u({T}, {G}) < 0 the
PNE is ({G}, {G}). This concludes the proof.
7 Uncertainty in the IS-MP Model
Now we consider the case where the income Y and the inflation π become uncertain due to
perturbations in {Y , π∗}. We analyse the case where a benevolent a tries to keep the income
as high as possible, ua = Y . As in Example 5.2, we consider different views of d in relation to
r. To model the case where d tries to maximize the inflation, we take ud = π. To model the
case where π is a dis-utility d tries to minimize π, we take ud = −π. The following theorem
consider both cases.
Theorem 11. Let S be a perturbation strength model for the IS-MP model with δa(e) =
δd(e) = 0, for any e ∈ E \ {Y , π
∗} and δa(Y ) > 0 and δd(π
∗) > 0. Consider and uncertainty
profile U = 〈E ,S, {Y , π∗}, {Y , π∗}, 1, 1, Y, ud〉. When ud = π the a/d game is
d
{Y } {π∗}
a
{Y } Y + δa(Y ) + δd(Y ), π Y + δa(Y ), π + δd(π
∗)
{π∗} Y + δd(Y ), π + δa(π
∗) Y, π + δa(π
∗) + δd(π
∗)
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{Y } is the dominant strategy for a and {π∗} is the dominant strategy for d. The unique
PNE is ({Y }, {π∗}) with Y ({Y }, {π∗}) = Y + δd(Y ) and π({Y }, {π
∗}) = π + δa(π
∗). When
ud = −π the game is
d
{Y } {π∗}
a
{Y } Y + δa(Y ) + δd(Y ), −π Y + δa(Y ), −π + δd(π
∗)
{π∗} Y + δd(Y ), −π + δa(π
∗) Y, −π + δa(π
∗) + δd(π
∗)
The dominant strategy for both a and d is {Y } and the only PNE is ({Y }, {Y }). In this
case Y ({Y }, {Y }) = Y + δa(Y ) + δd(Y ) and π({Y }, {Y }) = π.
Proof. Let us consider the game Γ(U). According to Lemma 5 we have
ua(a, d) = Y (a, d) = Y + δS(Y )[a, d], ud(a, d) = π(a, d) = π + δS(π
∗)[a, d]
The set of strategy profiles is:
Aa ×Ad = {({Y }, {Y }), ({Y }, {π
∗}), ({π∗}, {Y }), ({π∗}, {π∗})}
This gives the following bi-matrix form.
d
{Y } {π∗}
a
{Y } Y + δS(Y )[{Y }, {Y }], π + δS(π
∗)[{Y }, {Y }] . . . , . . .
{π∗} Y + δS(Y )[{π
∗}, {Y }], π + δS(π
∗)[{π∗}, {Y }] . . . , . . .
Consider the strategy profile (a, d) = ({Y }, {Y }). According to the Definition 4, as
Y ∈ a ∩ d = {Y }, it holds δS(Y )[a, d] = δa(Y ) + δd(Y ) and ua({Y }, {Y }) = Y + δa(Y ) +
δd(Y ). As π 6∈ a ∪ d = {Y }, the perturbation strength verifies δS(π
∗)[a, d] = 0 and therefore
ud({Y }, {Y }) = π. The remaining cases are similar and thus we get the claimed bi-matrix
form for Γ(U). Let us analyse dominance. For a, as δa(Y ) > 0, independently of the sign of
δd(π
∗), best responses verify Ba(Y ) = Ba(π
∗) = Y . For d, as δd(π
∗) > 0, best responses are
Bd(Y ) = Bd(π
∗) = π∗. The proof for U2 is similar and the claim follows.
It is worth observing that for 〈E ,S, {Y , π∗}, {Y , π∗}, 1, 1, Y, π〉, the selfish behaviour of a
and d give a PNE ({Y }, {π∗}) corresponding to a ”moderate” perturbed values i.e., Y ({Y }, {π∗}) =
Y + δa(Y ) and π({Y }, {π
∗}) = π + δd(π
∗). Selfish behaviour protect us from extreme be-
haviours with maximal income or maximal inflation. The two extreme cases have utilities
(
Y +
δa(Y )+δd(Y ), π
)
and
(
Y, π+δa(π
∗)+δd(π
∗)
)
. Situation changes when 〈E ,S, {Y , π∗}, {Y , π∗}, 1, 1, Y,−π〉.
In this case situation evolves to a PNE ({Y }, {Y }) such that Y ({Y }, {Y }) = Y +δa(Y )+δd(Y )
and π({Y }, {Y }) = π. In such a case a and d move on to get high income Y and to do not
touch at the inflation π.
A possible practical implication of the Theorem 7 follows. The perturbation model S
acts over Y and π∗ through δa(Y ) > 0, δa(π
∗), δd(Y ), δd(π
∗) > 0. When ud = π the PNE is
({Y }, {π∗}), when ud = −π the PNE is ({Y }, {Y }) it is worth noting that the Nash equilibria
are independent of the signs of δa(π
∗) and δd(Y ). As a consequence any policy trying to act
over δa(π
∗) or δd(Y ) will not modify the general structure of the Nash equilibria.
We conclude our study considering a subclass of zero-sum a/d games generalizing the
conditions of the uncertainty profiles considered in Example 5.2.
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Theorem 12. Let S be a perturbation strength model for the IS-MP model such that δa(e) =
δd(e) = 0, for any e ∈ P. Let U = 〈E ,S,A,D, 1, 1, u〉 where
u(a, d) = Y (a, d)− (Y ({∅}, {∅})/π({∅}, {∅}))π(a, d).
The associated zero-sum a/d game Γ(U) is:
d
{Y } {π∗}
a
{Y } δa(Y ) + δd(Y ) δa(Y )− (Y/M)δd(π
∗)
{π∗} δd(Y )− (Y/π)δa(π
∗) −(Y/π)(δa(π
∗) + δd(π
∗))
When δp(e) > 0, for p ∈ {a, d} and e ∈ {Y , π
∗}, {Y } is the dominant strategy for a and
{π∗} is the dominant strategy for d. Furthermore, ({Y }, {π∗}) is the unique PNE.
Proof. The tabular form of Γ(U) comes straightforward from the tabular form appearing
in the Theorem 11. With respect to dominance, let us compute best responses. The a
best response to {Y }, as δa(Y ) + δd(Y ) > δd(Y ) − (Y/π)δa(π
∗), verifies Ba({Y }) = {Y }
and similarly Ba({π
∗}) = {Y }. Consider now the best responses of d. When a chooses
{Y }, as δa(Y ) + δd(Y ) > δa(Y ) − (Y/M)δd(π
∗) and d tries to minimize the utility, we get
Bd({Y }) = {π
∗}. Similarly, when a chooses {π∗} we get Bd({π
∗}) = {π∗}.
8 Conclusions and Further Developments
We have shown how to adapt the a/d-framework provided in (Gabarro et al., 2014) to analyse
uncertainty in the IS-LM and the IS-MP models. In both cases, we have studied different
possible cases of uncertainty through the set of Nash equilibria showing the applicability of
the framework. In general, a common way to deal with uncertainty consists on modelling
several scenarios and develop qualitative likelihood analysis of the different cases. In our
proposed analysis positive and negative aspects are taken into account.
Our approach can be adapted to analyse uncertainty in other financial settings. As an
example, consider an option valuation using the Greeks (Hull, 1989). We develop now a
possible application based on ∆ where ∆ is the ratio between the changes in the price of
the derivative to the corresponding price of the underlying asset. We do that considering
uncertainty in the price f of a call option over a stock S. We use the one step binomial tree
model (Hull, 1989) having the following components:
Stock price S Time period T Up jump u
Strike price X Risk-free rate r Down jump d
Where S is the price of the stock, X is the strike price (the price at the expiration date), T
is the time period before expiration. The parameters u and d fixed such that, if stock goes
up the price (of the stock) should be S × u and if it goes down the price should be S × d.
Consider the following valuation taken from (Hull, 1989) serving us to introduce the basic
constructs:
S X T r u d
20 21 0.25 0.12 1.1 0.6
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In order to compute f , consider a portfolio having a long ∆ shares and one short call option.
If the stock goes up in 3 months (T = 0.25) it holds S × u > X and the payoff from the
derivative is fu = S × u−X = 1. The value of the portfolio in the up case is S × u×∆− fu.
If the stock goes down, fd = 0 the value is S × d×∆ − fd. In order to be risk-free ∆ needs
to verify S × u×∆− fu = S × d×∆− fd. Therefore
∆ =
fu − fd
S × u− S × d
=
1
10
and the value of the portfolio at the end of the period will be S × d×∆. To get the present
value v we discount at free-risk rate v = S× d×∆× e−r×T = 1.164535 and the price f of the
call is f = S ×∆× (1− v) = S ×∆× (1− d× e−r×T ) = 0.835465. As in a call the values S,
X and T are explicitly is written, therefore is no ambiguity about them. Therefore the set of
exogenous components is E = {r, u, d}. An example of a perturbation strength model S is
p r u d
a −0.05 +0.4 0
d +0.10 0 +0.3
Given the strategy profile (a, d) the new values of the perturbed set are E ′ = {r′, u′, d′}.
Let, consider the case (a, d) = ({u}, {d}). As r 6∈ {u, d} it holds is r′ = r. As u is only
selected by the angel, u′ = u+ δa(u) = 1.1 + 0.4 = 1.5. As d is just selected by the daemon
d′ = d+δd(d) = 0.6+0.3 = 0.9. As S×u
′ = 30 and fu′ = 30−21 = 9. As S×d
′ = 18 we have
fd′ = 0. As usual we shorten ∆(strengthS [{u}, {d}]) as ∆({u}, {d}) = 3/4 and f({u}, {d}) =
S ×∆({u}, {d})× (1− d′× e−r
′×T ) = 1.898985. As another case example of interest consider
the strategy where both a and d choose to strength r. In this case that is (a, d) = ({r}, {r}).
In this case u′ = u = 1.1, d′ = d = 00.6 and r′ = r+ δa(r)+ δd(r) = 0.12− 0.05+0.10 = 0.17.
As neither u nor d has been perturbed, ∆({r}, {r}) = ∆ = 1/10 and f({r}, {r}) = 0.8499314.
Let U = 〈E ,S, {{u}, {r}}, {{d}, {r}}, 1, 1, f〉 be an uncertainty profile for a call option. The
corresponding a/d game is:
d
{d} {r}
a
{u} 1.898985 4.321089
{r} 0.5780649 0.8499314
The only PNE is ({u}, {d}) with ν(U) = 1.898985. Therefore, in the uncertain situation
described by U perhaps the price of the call should be 1.898985 rather than 0.835465.
Studying the applicability of the a/d approach in other macroeconomic settings is of great
interest. In particular we are interested in compare our approach to other provided analytical
tools. To do so we would need to further analyse the structure and properties of the Nash
equilibria of the associated games. It is important to know the possibilities and limits of
the uncertainty profiles and a/d games in macroeconomics. As pointed in (Durlauf, 2012),
a way to decide with no probabilities is to guard against really bad cases. In such a setting
regret analysis provides a way to analyse such cases. Analysing the connection between a/d
and regret analysis would be interesting. In (Nordhaus, 2013), different scenarios are devel-
oped in order to analyse different possibilities in relation to climate change. For instance,
when considering the cost of meeting global temperature targets, two possible scenarios for
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the average-cost/temperature are considered. Those models are not far away from the ones
considered in this paper, thus uncertainty profiles and a/d could provide a complementary
analysis tool. Varian (1977) has studied the stability of the IS-LM model. As (Y (a, d), r(a, d))
can be seen as perturbations of the equilibrium point (Y, r) (see Lemmas 2, 3) if will be of
interest to study the relationship among of both models. In general, it would be interest-
ing to try to apply a/d-framework to non-linear models. Ever if general theorems seems
difficult to obtain, accurate numerical examples could be a first step to perform the compar-
ison. Moreover, in order to transform a/d-framework into a practical tool it seems necessary
to explore and develop the links with macroeconomic policy coordination and international
macroeconomic integration.
It is also important to know the possibilities, limits and weaknesses of the a/d approach.
We have considered uncertainty profiles U = 〈E ,S,A,D, ba, bd, ua, ud〉 where the spreads ba,
bd are fixed independently of the other parameters in U . It is interesting to consider the case
where the spreads are related to other parameters (see the first part of the Lemma 6), for
instance ba = ⌊
1
2#A⌋ or bd = ⌊
2
3#A⌋. Moreover, any U is a tuple having many parameters to
be determined. In principle those parameters are fixed by the analyser based on his perception
of the world an historical data. However the danger of over parametrization exists (Hull,
2010). Remind the von Neumann dictum, “with four parameters I can fit an elephant and
with five I can make him wiggle his trunk” (Dyson, 2004). Also possible connections between
uncertainty profiles and a/d games and the maxmin expected utility approach proposed by
(Gilboa & Schmeidler, 1989) and developed in (Hansen et al., 2006a,b) deserves further study.
Finally, in this paper we have consider only short-time models. The a/d approach for long-
time models is left open. A common way to deal with uncertainty along the time consists
on modelling the temporal evolution of several possible scenarios. As an example, consider
the two possible scenarios in the evolution (France, 1820-2100) of the annual value of bequest
and gifts (Piketty, 2014). Scenarios are given in terms of the growth of output g and of the
rate of return on capital r (do not confuse with the previous interest rate r). There is a
central scenario with g = 1.7% and r = 3.0% and an alternative scenario with g = 1.0% and
r = 5.0%. In order to tackle such cases, temporal aspects can be incorporated to game theory
using stochastic games (Shapley, 1953). In (Castro et al., 2015) a time dimension of the a/d
approach was integrated into the frame of stochastic automata. Perhaps this approach, based
on stochastic automata, could be adapted to deal with the uncertainty along the time of some
economic models.
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